chore(main): release 3.3.7 (#3577 )

Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <41898282+github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
doc: update config with new allowed request destinations option
2026-06-03 21:45:48 +00:00 · 2026-06-03 16:24:45 +01:00 · 2026-06-03 15:52:46 +01:00 · 2026-06-03 15:43:02 +01:00 · 2026-06-03 15:40:29 +01:00 · 2026-06-03 15:09:18 +01:00
--- a/.release-please-manifest.json
+++ b/.release-please-manifest.json
@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
 {
-  ".": "3.3.6"
+  ".": "3.3.7"
 }
--- a/CHANGELOG.md
+++ b/CHANGELOG.md
@@ -2,6 +2,21 @@

 This file contains all the latest changes and updates to Postal.

+## [3.3.7](https://github.com/postalserver/postal/compare/3.3.6...3.3.7) (2026-06-03)
+
+
+### Bug Fixes
+
+* **http:** prevent SSRF in outbound webhook and HTTP endpoint requests ([11c9814](https://github.com/postalserver/postal/commit/11c9814474f956619da35e8385ef7fab9f304de0))
+* **message-db:** prevent SQL injection via condition keys (GHSA-x2hq-rfpg-3xr5) ([4314a6e](https://github.com/postalserver/postal/commit/4314a6ec1e2812daa67dd20effd1db1769c1f8e8))
+* **specs:** stub IPv6 support in address guard IPv6 literal spec ([029bfe0](https://github.com/postalserver/postal/commit/029bfe098d9b8c0b5cafc49eac33e767f5748cd3))
+
+
+### Miscellaneous Chores
+
+* **deps:** upgrade rack & rails ([0445e5c](https://github.com/postalserver/postal/commit/0445e5c509870dfe9c16366c53dee3fc02ad3904))
+* update security vulnerability reporting instructions ([8be1e27](https://github.com/postalserver/postal/commit/8be1e27fec489ab659ef5e909f705932028b1694))
+
 ## [3.3.6](https://github.com/postalserver/postal/compare/3.3.5...3.3.6) (2026-04-28)


--- a/2
+++ b/2
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ gem "ostruct"
 gem "prometheus-client"
 gem "puma"
 gem "rackup"
-gem "rails", "= 7.1.5.2"
+gem "rails", "= 7.1.6"
 gem "resolv"
 gem "secure_headers"
 gem "sentry-rails"
--- a/Gemfile.lock
+++ b/Gemfile.lock
@@ -2,35 +2,36 @@ GEM
  remote: https://rubygems.org/
  specs:
    abbrev (0.1.2)
-    actioncable (7.1.5.2)
-      actionpack (= 7.1.5.2)
-      activesupport (= 7.1.5.2)
+    actioncable (7.1.6)
+      actionpack (= 7.1.6)
+      activesupport (= 7.1.6)
      nio4r (~> 2.0)
      websocket-driver (>= 0.6.1)
      zeitwerk (~> 2.6)
-    actionmailbox (7.1.5.2)
-      actionpack (= 7.1.5.2)
-      activejob (= 7.1.5.2)
-      activerecord (= 7.1.5.2)
-      activestorage (= 7.1.5.2)
-      activesupport (= 7.1.5.2)
+    actionmailbox (7.1.6)
+      actionpack (= 7.1.6)
+      activejob (= 7.1.6)
+      activerecord (= 7.1.6)
+      activestorage (= 7.1.6)
+      activesupport (= 7.1.6)
      mail (>= 2.7.1)
      net-imap
      net-pop
      net-smtp
-    actionmailer (7.1.5.2)
-      actionpack (= 7.1.5.2)
-      actionview (= 7.1.5.2)
-      activejob (= 7.1.5.2)
-      activesupport (= 7.1.5.2)
+    actionmailer (7.1.6)
+      actionpack (= 7.1.6)
+      actionview (= 7.1.6)
+      activejob (= 7.1.6)
+      activesupport (= 7.1.6)
      mail (~> 2.5, >= 2.5.4)
      net-imap
      net-pop
      net-smtp
      rails-dom-testing (~> 2.2)
-    actionpack (7.1.5.2)
-      actionview (= 7.1.5.2)
-      activesupport (= 7.1.5.2)
+    actionpack (7.1.6)
+      actionview (= 7.1.6)
+      activesupport (= 7.1.6)
+      cgi
      nokogiri (>= 1.8.5)
      racc
      rack (>= 2.2.4)
@@ -38,35 +39,36 @@ GEM
      rack-test (>= 0.6.3)
      rails-dom-testing (~> 2.2)
      rails-html-sanitizer (~> 1.6)
-    actiontext (7.1.5.2)
-      actionpack (= 7.1.5.2)
-      activerecord (= 7.1.5.2)
-      activestorage (= 7.1.5.2)
-      activesupport (= 7.1.5.2)
+    actiontext (7.1.6)
+      actionpack (= 7.1.6)
+      activerecord (= 7.1.6)
+      activestorage (= 7.1.6)
+      activesupport (= 7.1.6)
      globalid (>= 0.6.0)
      nokogiri (>= 1.8.5)
-    actionview (7.1.5.2)
-      activesupport (= 7.1.5.2)
+    actionview (7.1.6)
+      activesupport (= 7.1.6)
      builder (~> 3.1)
+      cgi
      erubi (~> 1.11)
      rails-dom-testing (~> 2.2)
      rails-html-sanitizer (~> 1.6)
-    activejob (7.1.5.2)
-      activesupport (= 7.1.5.2)
+    activejob (7.1.6)
+      activesupport (= 7.1.6)
      globalid (>= 0.3.6)
-    activemodel (7.1.5.2)
-      activesupport (= 7.1.5.2)
-    activerecord (7.1.5.2)
-      activemodel (= 7.1.5.2)
-      activesupport (= 7.1.5.2)
+    activemodel (7.1.6)
+      activesupport (= 7.1.6)
+    activerecord (7.1.6)
+      activemodel (= 7.1.6)
+      activesupport (= 7.1.6)
      timeout (>= 0.4.0)
-    activestorage (7.1.5.2)
-      actionpack (= 7.1.5.2)
-      activejob (= 7.1.5.2)
-      activerecord (= 7.1.5.2)
-      activesupport (= 7.1.5.2)
+    activestorage (7.1.6)
+      actionpack (= 7.1.6)
+      activejob (= 7.1.6)
+      activerecord (= 7.1.6)
+      activesupport (= 7.1.6)
      marcel (~> 1.0)
-    activesupport (7.1.5.2)
+    activesupport (7.1.6)
      base64
      benchmark (>= 0.3)
      bigdecimal
@@ -93,10 +95,11 @@ GEM
      execjs (~> 2)
    base64 (0.3.0)
    bcrypt (3.1.20)
-    benchmark (0.4.1)
-    bigdecimal (3.2.3)
+    benchmark (0.5.0)
+    bigdecimal (4.1.2)
    bindata (2.5.0)
-    builder (3.2.4)
+    builder (3.3.0)
+    cgi (0.5.1)
    chronic (0.10.2)
    coffee-rails (5.0.0)
      coffee-script (>= 2.2.0)
@@ -105,8 +108,8 @@ GEM
      coffee-script-source
      execjs
    coffee-script-source (1.12.2)
-    concurrent-ruby (1.3.5)
-    connection_pool (2.5.4)
+    concurrent-ruby (1.3.6)
+    connection_pool (3.0.2)
    crack (1.0.0)
      bigdecimal
      rexml
@@ -115,7 +118,7 @@ GEM
      activerecord (>= 5.a)
      database_cleaner-core (~> 2.0)
    database_cleaner-core (2.0.1)
-    date (3.4.1)
+    date (3.5.1)
    diff-lcs (1.6.2)
    domain_name (0.6.20240107)
    dotenv (3.0.2)
@@ -123,8 +126,8 @@ GEM
    dynamic_form (1.2.0)
    email_validator (2.2.4)
      activemodel
-    erb (5.0.2)
-    erubi (1.12.0)
+    erb (6.0.4)
+    erubi (1.13.1)
    execjs (2.7.0)
    factory_bot (6.4.6)
      activesupport (>= 5.0.0)
@@ -149,11 +152,12 @@ GEM
    hashdiff (1.1.0)
    hashie (5.0.0)
    highline (2.1.0)
-    i18n (1.14.7)
+    i18n (1.14.8)
      concurrent-ruby (~> 1.0)
-    io-console (0.8.1)
-    irb (1.15.2)
+    io-console (0.8.2)
+    irb (1.18.0)
      pp (>= 0.6.0)
+      prism (>= 1.3.0)
      rdoc (>= 4.0.0)
      reline (>= 0.4.2)
    jquery-rails (4.5.1)
@@ -189,42 +193,45 @@ GEM
    konfig-config (3.0.0)
      hashie
    logger (1.7.0)
-    loofah (2.24.1)
+    loofah (2.25.1)
      crass (~> 1.0.2)
      nokogiri (>= 1.12.0)
-    mail (2.8.1)
+    mail (2.9.0)
+      logger
      mini_mime (>= 0.1.1)
      net-imap
      net-pop
      net-smtp
-    marcel (1.1.0)
+    marcel (1.2.1)
    mini_mime (1.1.5)
-    minitest (5.25.5)
+    minitest (6.0.6)
+      drb (~> 2.0)
+      prism (~> 1.5)
    mutex_m (0.3.0)
    mysql2 (0.5.6)
    net-http (0.4.1)
      uri
-    net-imap (0.5.11)
+    net-imap (0.6.4)
      date
      net-protocol
    net-pop (0.1.2)
      net-protocol
    net-protocol (0.2.2)
      timeout
-    net-smtp (0.4.0.1)
+    net-smtp (0.5.1)
      net-protocol
    nifty-utils (1.1.7)
    nilify_blanks (1.4.0)
      activerecord (>= 4.0.0)
      activesupport (>= 4.0.0)
-    nio4r (2.7.4)
-    nokogiri (1.18.10-aarch64-linux-gnu)
+    nio4r (2.7.5)
+    nokogiri (1.19.3-aarch64-linux-gnu)
      racc (~> 1.4)
-    nokogiri (1.18.10-arm64-darwin)
+    nokogiri (1.19.3-arm64-darwin)
      racc (~> 1.4)
-    nokogiri (1.18.10-x86_64-darwin)
+    nokogiri (1.19.3-x86_64-darwin)
      racc (~> 1.4)
-    nokogiri (1.18.10-x86_64-linux-gnu)
+    nokogiri (1.19.3-x86_64-linux-gnu)
      racc (~> 1.4)
    omniauth (2.1.2)
      hashie (>= 3.4.6)
@@ -253,18 +260,19 @@ GEM
    parallel (1.22.1)
    parser (3.2.1.1)
      ast (~> 2.4.1)
-    pp (0.6.2)
+    pp (0.6.3)
      prettyprint
    prettyprint (0.2.0)
+    prism (1.9.0)
    prometheus-client (4.2.2)
-    psych (5.2.6)
+    psych (5.4.0)
      date
      stringio
    public_suffix (5.0.4)
    puma (7.0.4)
      nio4r (~> 2.0)
    racc (1.8.1)
-    rack (3.2.1)
+    rack (3.2.6)
    rack-oauth2 (2.2.1)
      activesupport
      attr_required
@@ -276,49 +284,52 @@ GEM
      base64 (>= 0.1.0)
      logger (>= 1.6.0)
      rack (>= 3.0.0, < 4)
-    rack-session (2.1.1)
+    rack-session (2.1.2)
      base64 (>= 0.1.0)
      rack (>= 3.0.0)
-    rack-test (2.1.0)
+    rack-test (2.2.0)
      rack (>= 1.3)
-    rackup (2.2.1)
+    rackup (2.3.1)
      rack (>= 3)
-    rails (7.1.5.2)
-      actioncable (= 7.1.5.2)
-      actionmailbox (= 7.1.5.2)
-      actionmailer (= 7.1.5.2)
-      actionpack (= 7.1.5.2)
-      actiontext (= 7.1.5.2)
-      actionview (= 7.1.5.2)
-      activejob (= 7.1.5.2)
-      activemodel (= 7.1.5.2)
-      activerecord (= 7.1.5.2)
-      activestorage (= 7.1.5.2)
-      activesupport (= 7.1.5.2)
+    rails (7.1.6)
+      actioncable (= 7.1.6)
+      actionmailbox (= 7.1.6)
+      actionmailer (= 7.1.6)
+      actionpack (= 7.1.6)
+      actiontext (= 7.1.6)
+      actionview (= 7.1.6)
+      activejob (= 7.1.6)
+      activemodel (= 7.1.6)
+      activerecord (= 7.1.6)
+      activestorage (= 7.1.6)
+      activesupport (= 7.1.6)
      bundler (>= 1.15.0)
-      railties (= 7.1.5.2)
-    rails-dom-testing (2.2.0)
+      railties (= 7.1.6)
+    rails-dom-testing (2.3.0)
      activesupport (>= 5.0.0)
      minitest
      nokogiri (>= 1.6)
-    rails-html-sanitizer (1.6.2)
-      loofah (~> 2.21)
+    rails-html-sanitizer (1.7.0)
+      loofah (~> 2.25)
      nokogiri (>= 1.15.7, != 1.16.7, != 1.16.6, != 1.16.5, != 1.16.4, != 1.16.3, != 1.16.2, != 1.16.1, != 1.16.0.rc1, != 1.16.0)
-    railties (7.1.5.2)
-      actionpack (= 7.1.5.2)
-      activesupport (= 7.1.5.2)
+    railties (7.1.6)
+      actionpack (= 7.1.6)
+      activesupport (= 7.1.6)
+      cgi
      irb
      rackup (>= 1.0.0)
      rake (>= 12.2)
      thor (~> 1.0, >= 1.2.2)
+      tsort (>= 0.2)
      zeitwerk (~> 2.6)
    rainbow (3.1.1)
-    rake (13.1.0)
-    rdoc (6.14.2)
+    rake (13.4.2)
+    rdoc (7.2.0)
      erb
      psych (>= 4.0.0)
+      tsort
    regexp_parser (2.7.0)
-    reline (0.6.2)
+    reline (0.6.3)
      io-console (~> 0.5)
    resolv (0.6.2)
    rexml (3.4.4)
@@ -387,17 +398,18 @@ GEM
      actionpack (>= 5.2)
      activesupport (>= 5.2)
      sprockets (>= 3.0.0)
-    stringio (3.1.7)
+    stringio (3.2.0)
    swd (2.0.3)
      activesupport (>= 3)
      attr_required (>= 0.0.5)
      faraday (~> 2.0)
      faraday-follow_redirects
    temple (0.10.3)
-    thor (1.3.0)
+    thor (1.5.0)
    tilt (2.3.0)
    timecop (0.9.8)
-    timeout (0.4.3)
+    timeout (0.6.1)
+    tsort (0.2.0)
    turbolinks (5.2.1)
      turbolinks-source (~> 5.2)
    turbolinks-source (5.2.0)
@@ -423,7 +435,7 @@ GEM
      base64
      websocket-extensions (>= 0.1.0)
    websocket-extensions (0.1.5)
-    zeitwerk (2.6.13)
+    zeitwerk (2.8.2)

 PLATFORMS
  aarch64-linux
@@ -467,7 +479,7 @@ DEPENDENCIES
  prometheus-client
  puma
  rackup
-  rails (= 7.1.5.2)
+  rails (= 7.1.6)
  resolv
  rspec
  rspec-rails
--- a/SECURITY.md
+++ b/SECURITY.md
@@ -11,5 +11,5 @@ We only support updates to the 3.x versions of Postal.

 ## Reporting a Vulnerability

-If you discover a vulnerability in Postal, please do not post an issue on GitHub. Instead you should send an
-e-mail to security@postalserver.io with details. We will get back to you directly.
+If you discover a vulnerability in Postal, please do not post an issue on GitHub. Please,
+instead, [create a new security advisory through GitHub](https://github.com/postalserver/postal/security/advisories/new).
--- a/app/controllers/legacy_api/messages_controller.rb
+++ b/app/controllers/legacy_api/messages_controller.rb
@@ -15,12 +15,9 @@ module LegacyAPI
    #                   OR an error if the message does not exist.
    #
    def message
-      if api_params["id"].blank?
-        render_parameter_error "`id` parameter is required but is missing"
-        return
-      end
+      message = find_message
+      return if performed?

-      message = @current_credential.server.message(api_params["id"])
      message_hash = { id: message.id, token: message.token }
      expansions = api_params["_expansions"]

@@ -111,12 +108,9 @@ module LegacyAPI
    #                   OR an error if the message does not exist.
    #
    def deliveries
-      if api_params["id"].blank?
-        render_parameter_error "`id` parameter is required but is missing"
-        return
-      end
+      message = find_message
+      return if performed?

-      message = @current_credential.server.message(api_params["id"])
      deliveries = message.deliveries.map do |d|
        {
          id: d.id,
@@ -136,5 +130,37 @@ module LegacyAPI
                   id: api_params["id"]
    end

+    private
+
+    # Look up the message referenced by the request's `id` parameter.
+    #
+    # The legacy API only ever identifies a message by its integer ID. The
+    # request body is parsed as JSON, so without validation a JSON object or
+    # array supplied for `id` would arrive as a Ruby Hash/Array and be passed
+    # straight through to the message database as a raw set of SQL conditions.
+    # We therefore reject anything that is not a simple scalar before it can
+    # reach the database and coerce the value to an integer ID.
+    #
+    # Renders an error and returns nil when the parameter is missing or is not
+    # a scalar; otherwise returns the matched message (raising NotFound when no
+    # message matches, which the actions rescue).
+    #
+    # @return [Postal::MessageDB::Message, nil]
+    def find_message
+      id = api_params["id"]
+
+      if id.blank?
+        render_parameter_error "`id` parameter is required but is missing"
+        return
+      end
+
+      unless id.is_a?(String) || id.is_a?(Integer)
+        render_parameter_error "`id` parameter must be a string or integer"
+        return
+      end
+
+      @current_credential.server.message(id.to_i)
+    end
+
  end
 end
--- a/app/models/http_endpoint.rb
+++ b/app/models/http_endpoint.rb
@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@
 # frozen_string_literal: true

+require "uri"
+
 # == Schema Information
 #
 # Table name: http_endpoints
@@ -38,6 +40,7 @@ class HTTPEndpoint < ApplicationRecord

  validates :name, presence: true
  validates :url, presence: true
+  validate :url_must_be_http_or_https
  validates :encoding, inclusion: { in: ENCODINGS }
  validates :format, inclusion: { in: FORMATS }
  validates :timeout, numericality: { greater_than_or_equal_to: 5, less_than_or_equal_to: 60 }
@@ -56,4 +59,17 @@ class HTTPEndpoint < ApplicationRecord
    routes.each { |r| r.update(endpoint: nil, mode: "Reject") }
  end

+  private
+
+  def url_must_be_http_or_https
+    return if url.blank?
+
+    uri = URI.parse(url)
+    return if uri.is_a?(URI::HTTP) && uri.host.present?
+
+    errors.add(:url, "must be an HTTP or HTTPS URL")
+  rescue URI::InvalidURIError
+    errors.add(:url, "must be a valid HTTP or HTTPS URL")
+  end
+
 end
--- a/doc/config/environment-variables.md
+++ b/doc/config/environment-variables.md
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ This document contains all the environment variables which are available for thi
 | `POSTAL_SIGNING_KEY_PATH` | String | Path to the private key used for signing | $config-file-root/signing.key |
 | `POSTAL_SMTP_RELAYS` | Array of strings | An array of SMTP relays in the format of smtp://host:port | [] |
 | `POSTAL_TRUSTED_PROXIES` | Array of strings | An array of IP addresses to trust for proxying requests to Postal (in addition to localhost addresses) | [] |
+| `POSTAL_ALLOWED_REQUEST_DESTINATIONS` | Array of strings | Hostnames or IP/CIDR ranges that outbound webhook and HTTP endpoint requests are permitted to reach even when they resolve to a private, loopback, link-local or otherwise reserved address. All other such destinations are blocked to prevent SSRF. | [] |
 | `POSTAL_QUEUED_MESSAGE_LOCK_STALE_DAYS` | Integer | The number of days after which to consider a lock as stale. Messages with stale locks will be removed and not retried. | 1 |
 | `POSTAL_BATCH_QUEUED_MESSAGES` | Boolean | When enabled queued messages will be de-queued in batches based on their destination | true |
 | `WEB_SERVER_DEFAULT_PORT` | Integer | The default port the web server should listen on unless overriden by the PORT environment variable | 5000 |
--- a/doc/config/yaml.yml
+++ b/doc/config/yaml.yml
@@ -29,6 +29,8 @@ postal:
  smtp_relays: []
  # An array of IP addresses to trust for proxying requests to Postal (in addition to localhost addresses)
  trusted_proxies: []
+  # Hostnames or IP/CIDR ranges that outbound webhook and HTTP endpoint requests are permitted to reach even when they resolve to a private, loopback, link-local or otherwise reserved address. All other such destinations are blocked to prevent SSRF.
+  allowed_request_destinations: []
  # The number of days after which to consider a lock as stale. Messages with stale locks will be removed and not retried.
  queued_message_lock_stale_days: 1
  # When enabled queued messages will be de-queued in batches based on their destination
--- a/lib/postal/config_schema.rb
+++ b/lib/postal/config_schema.rb
@@ -92,6 +92,14 @@ module Postal
        transform { |ip| IPAddr.new(ip) }
      end

+      string :allowed_request_destinations do
+        array
+        description "Hostnames or IP/CIDR ranges that outbound webhook and HTTP " \
+                    "endpoint requests are permitted to reach even when they resolve " \
+                    "to a private, loopback, link-local or otherwise reserved address. " \
+                    "All other such destinations are blocked to prevent SSRF."
+      end
+
      integer :queued_message_lock_stale_days do
        description "The number of days after which to consider a lock as stale. Messages with stale locks will be removed and not retried."
        default 1
--- a/lib/postal/http.rb
+++ b/lib/postal/http.rb
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 # frozen_string_literal: true

 require "net/https"
+require "resolv"
 require "uri"

 module Postal
@@ -47,19 +48,24 @@ module Postal

      request["User-Agent"] = options[:user_agent] || "Postal/#{Postal.version}"

-      connection = Net::HTTP.new(uri.host, uri.port)
-
-      if uri.scheme == "https"
-        connection.use_ssl = true
-        connection.verify_mode = OpenSSL::SSL::VERIFY_PEER
-        ssl = true
-      else
-        ssl = false
-      end
+      timeout = options[:timeout] || 60
+      ssl = uri.scheme == "https"

      begin
-        timeout = options[:timeout] || 60
        Timeout.timeout(timeout) do
+          connect_address = AddressGuard.safe_connect_address(uri.host)
+
+          connection = Net::HTTP.new(uri.host, uri.port)
+          # Pin the connection to the address we validated above so that the socket
+          # cannot be redirected to a different (e.g. internal) address via a DNS
+          # rebinding race between the check and the connection.
+          connection.ipaddr = connect_address
+
+          if uri.scheme == "https"
+            connection.use_ssl = true
+            connection.verify_mode = OpenSSL::SSL::VERIFY_PEER
+          end
+
          result = connection.request(request)
          {
            code: result.code.to_i,
@@ -68,6 +74,13 @@ module Postal
            secure: ssl
          }
        end
+      rescue BlockedDestinationError => e
+        {
+          code: -4,
+          body: e.message,
+          headers: {},
+          secure: ssl
+        }
      rescue OpenSSL::SSL::SSLError
        {
          code: -3,
@@ -75,7 +88,7 @@ module Postal
          headers: {},
          secure: ssl
        }
-      rescue SocketError, Errno::ECONNRESET, EOFError, Errno::EINVAL, Errno::ENETUNREACH, Errno::EHOSTUNREACH, Errno::ECONNREFUSED => e
+      rescue Resolv::ResolvError, SocketError, SystemCallError, EOFError => e
        {
          code: -2,
          body: e.message,
--- a/lib/postal/http/address_guard.rb
+++ b/lib/postal/http/address_guard.rb
@@ -0,0 +1,202 @@
+# frozen_string_literal: true
+
+require "ipaddr"
+require "resolv"
+require "socket"
+
+module Postal
+  module HTTP
+    # Guards outbound HTTP requests against SSRF by resolving the destination
+    # host and refusing to connect to private, loopback, link-local, multicast
+    # or otherwise reserved addresses (for example cloud metadata endpoints).
+    #
+    # Administrators can permit specific destinations by adding hostnames or
+    # IP/CIDR ranges to the `postal.allowed_request_destinations` config option.
+    class AddressGuard
+
+      # IP ranges that outbound requests are never allowed to reach unless the
+      # destination has been explicitly allowlisted.
+      BLOCKED_RANGES = [
+        # IPv4
+        "0.0.0.0/8",        # "this host on this network"
+        "10.0.0.0/8",       # RFC1918 private
+        "100.64.0.0/10",    # RFC6598 carrier-grade NAT
+        "127.0.0.0/8",      # loopback
+        "169.254.0.0/16",   # link-local (incl. 169.254.169.254 metadata)
+        "172.16.0.0/12",    # RFC1918 private
+        "192.0.0.0/24",     # IETF protocol assignments
+        "192.168.0.0/16",   # RFC1918 private
+        "198.18.0.0/15",    # benchmarking
+        "224.0.0.0/4",      # multicast
+        "240.0.0.0/4",      # reserved
+        # IPv6
+        "::/128",           # unspecified
+        "::1/128",          # loopback
+        "::ffff:0:0/96",    # IPv4-mapped (also re-checked against the v4 list)
+        "fc00::/7",         # unique-local
+        "fe80::/10",        # link-local
+        "ff00::/8", # multicast
+      ].map { |range| IPAddr.new(range) }.freeze
+
+      class << self
+
+        # Resolve and validate the given host, returning the IP address the
+        # connection should be pinned to (as a string). Pinning the connection
+        # to the validated address prevents a DNS-rebinding race between the
+        # check here and the actual connection.
+        #
+        # @param [String] host the hostname or IP literal from the request URL
+        # @raise [Postal::HTTP::BlockedDestinationError] if the host cannot be
+        #   resolved or any resolved address is not permitted
+        # @raise [SocketError] if the host only resolves to addresses whose
+        #   family this server cannot reach (e.g. IPv6 with no IPv6 support)
+        # @return [String] the validated IP address to connect to
+        def safe_connect_address(host)
+          new(host).safe_connect_address
+        end
+
+        # Whether this server has IPv6 connectivity (a global IPv6 address on
+        # one of its interfaces). Memoized as it does not change at runtime.
+        def ipv6_supported?
+          return @ipv6_supported unless @ipv6_supported.nil?
+
+          @ipv6_supported = local_families.include?(:ipv6)
+        end
+
+        # Whether this server has IPv4 connectivity. Defaults to true unless the
+        # host clearly only has IPv6, so that a host reporting no global
+        # addresses at all (e.g. inside a minimal container) still attempts IPv4
+        # as it did before this guard existed.
+        def ipv4_supported?
+          return @ipv4_supported unless @ipv4_supported.nil?
+
+          families = local_families
+          @ipv4_supported = families.include?(:ipv4) || !families.include?(:ipv6)
+        end
+
+        private
+
+        def local_families
+          families = []
+          Socket.ip_address_list.each do |address|
+            families << :ipv4 if address.ipv4? && !address.ipv4_loopback?
+            families << :ipv6 if address.ipv6? && !address.ipv6_loopback? && !address.ipv6_linklocal?
+          end
+          families.uniq
+        end
+
+      end
+
+      # @param [String] host
+      def initialize(host)
+        @host = host.to_s
+      end
+
+      def safe_connect_address
+        if @host.empty?
+          raise BlockedDestinationError, "No host was given for the request"
+        end
+
+        addresses = resolve
+        if addresses.empty?
+          raise BlockedDestinationError, "Could not resolve '#{@host}' to any IP address"
+        end
+
+        # Reject the whole request if *any* resolved address is blocked. This is
+        # checked before the reachability filtering below so that a blocked
+        # destination is always reported as such, regardless of which address
+        # families this particular server can reach. It also defeats DNS
+        # responses that mix a public and a private address to slip past.
+        addresses.each do |address|
+          next unless blocked?(address)
+
+          raise BlockedDestinationError,
+                "Destination '#{@host}' (#{address}) is not permitted"
+        end
+
+        # Only connect to an address whose family this server can actually
+        # reach. Otherwise we might pin the connection to an IPv6 address on a
+        # host without IPv6 connectivity and fail to connect even when a usable
+        # IPv4 address was available.
+        usable = addresses.select { |address| family_reachable?(address) }
+        if usable.empty?
+          raise SocketError,
+                "'#{@host}' only resolves to addresses this server cannot reach " \
+                "(#{addresses.join(', ')})"
+        end
+
+        # Prefer IPv4 for predictability; only use IPv6 when it is the only
+        # reachable option.
+        (usable.find(&:ipv4?) || usable.first).to_s
+      end
+
+      private
+
+      # @return [Array<IPAddr>]
+      def resolve
+        return [IPAddr.new(@host)] if ip_literal?
+
+        Resolv.getaddresses(@host).filter_map do |address|
+          IPAddr.new(address)
+        rescue IPAddr::InvalidAddressError
+          nil
+        end
+      end
+
+      def ip_literal?
+        IPAddr.new(@host)
+        true
+      rescue IPAddr::InvalidAddressError
+        false
+      end
+
+      # @param [IPAddr] address
+      def family_reachable?(address)
+        if address.ipv6? && !address.ipv4_mapped?
+          self.class.ipv6_supported?
+        else
+          self.class.ipv4_supported?
+        end
+      end
+
+      # @param [IPAddr] address
+      def blocked?(address)
+        return false if allowlisted?(address)
+
+        # IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses (::ffff:a.b.c.d) must be checked against the
+        # IPv4 rules using the embedded address, otherwise they bypass the list.
+        if address.ipv6? && address.ipv4_mapped?
+          mapped = address.native
+          return true if mapped.ipv4? && BLOCKED_RANGES.any? { |range| range.include?(mapped) }
+        end
+
+        BLOCKED_RANGES.any? { |range| range.include?(address) }
+      end
+
+      # @param [IPAddr] address
+      def allowlisted?(address)
+        allowlist.any? do |entry|
+          if entry.is_a?(IPAddr)
+            entry.include?(address)
+          else
+            entry.casecmp?(@host)
+          end
+        end
+      end
+
+      # Allowlist entries are kept as strings in config. An entry that parses as
+      # an IP/CIDR is matched against the resolved address; anything else is
+      # matched against the request hostname (case-insensitively).
+      #
+      # @return [Array<IPAddr, String>]
+      def allowlist
+        @allowlist ||= Array(Postal::Config.postal.allowed_request_destinations).map do |entry|
+          IPAddr.new(entry.to_s)
+        rescue IPAddr::InvalidAddressError
+          entry.to_s
+        end
+      end
+
+    end
+  end
+end
--- a/lib/postal/http/blocked_destination_error.rb
+++ b/lib/postal/http/blocked_destination_error.rb
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+# frozen_string_literal: true
+
+module Postal
+  module HTTP
+    # Raised when an outbound request would be sent to an address that is not
+    # permitted (a private, loopback, link-local or otherwise reserved address
+    # that has not been explicitly allowlisted). Used as an SSRF guard.
+    class BlockedDestinationError < StandardError
+    end
+  end
+end
--- a/lib/postal/message_db/database.rb
+++ b/lib/postal/message_db/database.rb
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ module Postal
      # Return the total size of all stored messages
      #
      def total_size
-        query("SELECT SUM(size) AS size FROM `#{database_name}`.`raw_message_sizes`").first["size"] || 0
+        query("SELECT SUM(size) AS size FROM #{escape_identifier(database_name)}.`raw_message_sizes`").first["size"] || 0
      end

      #
@@ -151,11 +151,11 @@ module Postal
        if options[:count]
          sql_query << " COUNT(id) AS count"
        elsif options[:fields]
-          sql_query << (" " + options[:fields].map { |f| "`#{f}`" }.join(", "))
+          sql_query << (" " + options[:fields].map { |f| escape_identifier(f) }.join(", "))
        else
          sql_query << " *"
        end
-        sql_query << " FROM `#{database_name}`.`#{table}`"
+        sql_query << " FROM #{escape_identifier(database_name)}.#{escape_identifier(table)}"
        if options[:where].present?
          sql_query << (" " + build_where_string(options[:where], " AND "))
        end
@@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ module Postal
          direction = (options[:direction] || "ASC").upcase
          raise Postal::Error, "Invalid direction #{options[:direction]}" unless %w[ASC DESC].include?(direction)

-          sql_query << " ORDER BY `#{options[:order]}` #{direction}"
+          sql_query << " ORDER BY #{escape_identifier(options[:order])} #{direction}"
        end

        if options[:limit]
@@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ module Postal
      # Will return the total number of affected rows.
      #
      def update(table, attributes, options = {})
-        sql_query = "UPDATE `#{database_name}`.`#{table}` SET"
+        sql_query = "UPDATE #{escape_identifier(database_name)}.#{escape_identifier(table)} SET"
        sql_query << " #{hash_to_sql(attributes)}"
        if options[:where]
          sql_query << (" " + build_where_string(options[:where]))
@@ -227,8 +227,8 @@ module Postal
      # Will return the ID of the new item.
      #
      def insert(table, attributes)
-        sql_query = "INSERT INTO `#{database_name}`.`#{table}`"
-        sql_query << (" (" + attributes.keys.map { |k| "`#{k}`" }.join(", ") + ")")
+        sql_query = "INSERT INTO #{escape_identifier(database_name)}.#{escape_identifier(table)}"
+        sql_query << (" (" + attributes.keys.map { |k| escape_identifier(k) }.join(", ") + ")")
        sql_query << (" VALUES (" + attributes.values.map { |v| escape(v) }.join(", ") + ")")
        with_mysql do |mysql|
          query_on_connection(mysql, sql_query)
@@ -243,8 +243,8 @@ module Postal
        if values.empty?
          nil
        else
-          sql_query = "INSERT INTO `#{database_name}`.`#{table}`"
-          sql_query << (" (" + keys.map { |k| "`#{k}`" }.join(", ") + ")")
+          sql_query = "INSERT INTO #{escape_identifier(database_name)}.#{escape_identifier(table)}"
+          sql_query << (" (" + keys.map { |k| escape_identifier(k) }.join(", ") + ")")
          sql_query << " VALUES "
          sql_query << values.map { |v| "(" + v.map { |r| escape(r) }.join(", ") + ")" }.join(", ")
          query(sql_query)
@@ -260,7 +260,7 @@ module Postal
      # Will return the total number of affected rows.
      #
      def delete(table, options = {})
-        sql_query = "DELETE FROM `#{database_name}`.`#{table}`"
+        sql_query = "DELETE FROM #{escape_identifier(database_name)}.#{escape_identifier(table)}"
        sql_query << (" " + build_where_string(options[:where], " AND "))
        with_mysql do |mysql|
          query_on_connection(mysql, sql_query)
@@ -351,32 +351,41 @@ module Postal

      def hash_to_sql(hash, joiner = ", ")
        hash.map do |key, value|
+          column = escape_identifier(key)
          if value.is_a?(Array) && value.all? { |v| v.is_a?(Integer) }
-            "`#{key}` IN (#{value.join(', ')})"
+            "#{column} IN (#{value.join(', ')})"
          elsif value.is_a?(Array)
            escaped_values = value.map { |v| escape(v) }.join(", ")
-            "`#{key}` IN (#{escaped_values})"
+            "#{column} IN (#{escaped_values})"
          elsif value.is_a?(Hash)
            sql = []
            value.each do |operator, inner_value|
              case operator
              when :less_than
-                sql << "`#{key}` < #{escape(inner_value)}"
+                sql << "#{column} < #{escape(inner_value)}"
              when :greater_than
-                sql << "`#{key}` > #{escape(inner_value)}"
+                sql << "#{column} > #{escape(inner_value)}"
              when :less_than_or_equal_to
-                sql << "`#{key}` <= #{escape(inner_value)}"
+                sql << "#{column} <= #{escape(inner_value)}"
              when :greater_than_or_equal_to
-                sql << "`#{key}` >= #{escape(inner_value)}"
+                sql << "#{column} >= #{escape(inner_value)}"
              end
            end
            sql.empty? ? "1=1" : sql.join(joiner)
          else
-            "`#{key}` = #{escape(value)}"
+            "#{column} = #{escape(value)}"
          end
        end.join(joiner)
      end

+      # Escape a value for safe use as a MySQL identifier (e.g. a column or
+      # table name). Identifiers are wrapped in backticks and any backtick
+      # within the identifier is doubled so it cannot break out of the quoting
+      # and inject arbitrary SQL.
+      def escape_identifier(identifier)
+        "`" + identifier.to_s.gsub("`", "``") + "`"
+      end
+
    end
  end
 end
--- a/spec/apis/legacy_api/messages/deliveries_spec.rb
+++ b/spec/apis/legacy_api/messages/deliveries_spec.rb
@@ -64,6 +64,23 @@ RSpec.describe "Legacy Messages API", type: :request do
        end
      end

+      # Regression test for GHSA-x2hq-rfpg-3xr5 (see message_spec.rb). A JSON
+      # object supplied for `id` must be rejected before reaching the database
+      # rather than being interpreted as a raw set of SQL conditions.
+      context "when the message ID is a JSON object (SQL injection attempt)" do
+        it "rejects it with a parameter error and never reaches the database" do
+          expect_any_instance_of(Server).not_to receive(:message)
+          post "/api/v1/messages/deliveries",
+               headers: { "x-server-api-key" => credential.key,
+                          "content-type" => "application/json" },
+               params: { id: { "id`=0 OR SLEEP(5)#" => "x" } }.to_json
+          expect(response.status).to eq 200
+          parsed_body = JSON.parse(response.body)
+          expect(parsed_body["status"]).to eq "parameter-error"
+          expect(parsed_body["data"]["message"]).to match(/must be a string or integer/)
+        end
+      end
+
      context "when the message ID exists" do
        let(:server) { create(:server) }
        let(:credential) { create(:credential, server: server) }
--- a/spec/apis/legacy_api/messages/message_spec.rb
+++ b/spec/apis/legacy_api/messages/message_spec.rb
@@ -63,6 +63,56 @@ RSpec.describe "Legacy Messages API", type: :request do
        end
      end

+      # Regression tests for GHSA-x2hq-rfpg-3xr5. The request body is parsed as
+      # JSON, so a JSON object/array supplied for `id` would otherwise arrive as
+      # a Ruby Hash/Array and be passed straight through to the message database
+      # as a raw set of SQL conditions (blind SQL injection). These must be
+      # rejected before reaching the database.
+      context "when the message ID is a JSON object (SQL injection attempt)" do
+        it "rejects it with a parameter error and never reaches the database" do
+          expect_any_instance_of(Server).not_to receive(:message)
+          post "/api/v1/messages/message",
+               headers: { "x-server-api-key" => credential.key,
+                          "content-type" => "application/json" },
+               params: { id: { "id`=0 OR SLEEP(5)#" => "x" } }.to_json
+          expect(response.status).to eq 200
+          parsed_body = JSON.parse(response.body)
+          expect(parsed_body["status"]).to eq "parameter-error"
+          expect(parsed_body["data"]["message"]).to match(/must be a string or integer/)
+        end
+      end
+
+      context "when the message ID is a JSON array" do
+        it "rejects it with a parameter error" do
+          post "/api/v1/messages/message",
+               headers: { "x-server-api-key" => credential.key,
+                          "content-type" => "application/json" },
+               params: { id: [1, 2, 3] }.to_json
+          expect(response.status).to eq 200
+          parsed_body = JSON.parse(response.body)
+          expect(parsed_body["status"]).to eq "parameter-error"
+          expect(parsed_body["data"]["message"]).to match(/must be a string or integer/)
+        end
+      end
+
+      context "when the message ID is provided as a numeric string" do
+        let(:message) { MessageFactory.outgoing(server) }
+
+        it "is coerced to an integer and looks the message up" do
+          post "/api/v1/messages/message",
+               headers: { "x-server-api-key" => credential.key,
+                          "content-type" => "application/json" },
+               params: { id: message.id.to_s }.to_json
+          expect(response.status).to eq 200
+          parsed_body = JSON.parse(response.body)
+          expect(parsed_body["status"]).to eq "success"
+          expect(parsed_body["data"]).to match({
+            "id" => message.id,
+            "token" => message.token
+          })
+        end
+      end
+
      context "when the message ID exists" do
        let(:server) { create(:server) }
        let(:credential) { create(:credential, server: server) }
--- a/spec/lib/postal/http/address_guard_spec.rb
+++ b/spec/lib/postal/http/address_guard_spec.rb
@@ -0,0 +1,192 @@
+# frozen_string_literal: true
+
+require "rails_helper"
+
+RSpec.describe Postal::HTTP::AddressGuard do
+  describe ".safe_connect_address" do
+    subject(:call) { described_class.safe_connect_address(host) }
+
+    before do
+      allow(Postal::Config.postal).to receive(:allowed_request_destinations).and_return(allowlist)
+    end
+
+    let(:allowlist) { [] }
+
+    context "when given a public IP literal" do
+      let(:host) { "93.184.216.34" }
+
+      it "returns the address to connect to" do
+        expect(call).to eq "93.184.216.34"
+      end
+    end
+
+    context "when given a public IPv6 literal" do
+      let(:host) { "2606:2800:220:1:248:1893:25c8:1946" }
+
+      before { allow(described_class).to receive(:ipv6_supported?).and_return(true) }
+
+      it "returns the address to connect to" do
+        expect(call).to eq "2606:2800:220:1:248:1893:25c8:1946"
+      end
+    end
+
+    [
+      "127.0.0.1",
+      "10.0.0.1",
+      "172.16.5.4",
+      "192.168.1.1",
+      "169.254.169.254", # cloud metadata
+      "100.64.0.1",      # carrier-grade NAT
+      "0.0.0.0",
+      "::1",
+      "fd00::1",         # unique-local IPv6
+      "fe80::1",         # link-local IPv6
+      "::ffff:127.0.0.1", # IPv4-mapped loopback
+    ].each do |blocked|
+      context "when given the blocked address #{blocked}" do
+        let(:host) { blocked }
+
+        it "raises BlockedDestinationError" do
+          expect { call }.to raise_error(Postal::HTTP::BlockedDestinationError)
+        end
+      end
+    end
+
+    context "when given a hostname that resolves to a public address" do
+      let(:host) { "example.com" }
+
+      before do
+        allow(Resolv).to receive(:getaddresses).with(host).and_return(["93.184.216.34"])
+      end
+
+      it "returns the resolved address" do
+        expect(call).to eq "93.184.216.34"
+      end
+    end
+
+    context "when given a hostname that resolves to a private address" do
+      let(:host) { "internal.example.com" }
+
+      before do
+        allow(Resolv).to receive(:getaddresses).with(host).and_return(["10.1.2.3"])
+      end
+
+      it "raises BlockedDestinationError" do
+        expect { call }.to raise_error(Postal::HTTP::BlockedDestinationError)
+      end
+    end
+
+    context "when a hostname resolves to both a public and a private address" do
+      let(:host) { "rebind.example.com" }
+
+      before do
+        allow(Resolv).to receive(:getaddresses).with(host).and_return(["93.184.216.34", "127.0.0.1"])
+      end
+
+      it "raises BlockedDestinationError because one address is blocked" do
+        expect { call }.to raise_error(Postal::HTTP::BlockedDestinationError)
+      end
+    end
+
+    context "when a hostname resolves to both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses" do
+      let(:host) { "dualstack.example.com" }
+      let(:ipv6) { "2606:2800:220:1:248:1893:25c8:1946" }
+
+      before do
+        allow(Resolv).to receive(:getaddresses).with(host).and_return([ipv6, "93.184.216.34"])
+      end
+
+      context "and the server does not support IPv6" do
+        before { allow(described_class).to receive(:ipv6_supported?).and_return(false) }
+
+        it "connects over IPv4" do
+          expect(call).to eq "93.184.216.34"
+        end
+      end
+
+      context "and the server supports IPv6" do
+        before { allow(described_class).to receive(:ipv6_supported?).and_return(true) }
+
+        it "still prefers IPv4 for predictability" do
+          expect(call).to eq "93.184.216.34"
+        end
+      end
+    end
+
+    context "when a hostname resolves only to an IPv6 address" do
+      let(:host) { "v6only.example.com" }
+      let(:ipv6) { "2606:2800:220:1:248:1893:25c8:1946" }
+
+      before do
+        allow(Resolv).to receive(:getaddresses).with(host).and_return([ipv6])
+      end
+
+      context "and the server does not support IPv6" do
+        before { allow(described_class).to receive(:ipv6_supported?).and_return(false) }
+
+        it "raises a SocketError because the address is unreachable" do
+          expect { call }.to raise_error(SocketError)
+        end
+      end
+
+      context "and the server supports IPv6" do
+        before { allow(described_class).to receive(:ipv6_supported?).and_return(true) }
+
+        it "connects over IPv6" do
+          expect(call).to eq ipv6
+        end
+      end
+    end
+
+    context "when a hostname cannot be resolved" do
+      let(:host) { "nope.example.com" }
+
+      before do
+        allow(Resolv).to receive(:getaddresses).with(host).and_return([])
+      end
+
+      it "raises BlockedDestinationError" do
+        expect { call }.to raise_error(Postal::HTTP::BlockedDestinationError, /resolve/)
+      end
+    end
+
+    context "when the host is blank" do
+      let(:host) { "" }
+
+      it "raises BlockedDestinationError" do
+        expect { call }.to raise_error(Postal::HTTP::BlockedDestinationError)
+      end
+    end
+
+    context "when a blocked address is allowlisted by CIDR" do
+      let(:host) { "10.0.0.5" }
+      let(:allowlist) { ["10.0.0.0/8"] }
+
+      it "returns the address" do
+        expect(call).to eq "10.0.0.5"
+      end
+    end
+
+    context "when a blocked address is allowlisted by exact IP" do
+      let(:host) { "127.0.0.1" }
+      let(:allowlist) { ["127.0.0.1"] }
+
+      it "returns the address" do
+        expect(call).to eq "127.0.0.1"
+      end
+    end
+
+    context "when a hostname resolving to a private address is allowlisted by name" do
+      let(:host) { "internal.example.com" }
+      let(:allowlist) { ["internal.example.com"] }
+
+      before do
+        allow(Resolv).to receive(:getaddresses).with(host).and_return(["10.1.2.3"])
+      end
+
+      it "returns the resolved address" do
+        expect(call).to eq "10.1.2.3"
+      end
+    end
+  end
+end
--- a/spec/lib/postal/http_spec.rb
+++ b/spec/lib/postal/http_spec.rb
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+# frozen_string_literal: true
+
+require "rails_helper"
+
+RSpec.describe Postal::HTTP do
+  before do
+    allow(Postal::Config.postal).to receive(:allowed_request_destinations).and_return([])
+  end
+
+  describe ".post" do
+    context "when the host resolves to a blocked address" do
+      before do
+        allow(Resolv).to receive(:getaddresses).with("internal.example.com").and_return(["127.0.0.1"])
+      end
+
+      it "does not make a request and returns a blocked-destination result" do
+        result = described_class.post("http://internal.example.com/hook", json: "{}")
+        expect(result[:code]).to eq(-4)
+        expect(result[:body]).to match(/not permitted/)
+        expect(WebMock).not_to have_requested(:post, "http://internal.example.com/hook")
+      end
+    end
+
+    context "when resolving the host raises an error" do
+      before do
+        allow(Resolv).to receive(:getaddresses).with("example.com").and_raise(Resolv::ResolvError, "resolver failed")
+      end
+
+      it "returns a connection error result" do
+        result = described_class.post("http://example.com/hook", json: "{}")
+        expect(result[:code]).to eq(-2)
+        expect(result[:body]).to match(/resolver failed/)
+        expect(WebMock).not_to have_requested(:post, "http://example.com/hook")
+      end
+    end
+
+    context "when resolving the host exceeds the request timeout" do
+      before do
+        allow(Resolv).to receive(:getaddresses).with("example.com") do
+          sleep 0.2
+          ["93.184.216.34"]
+        end
+      end
+
+      it "returns a timeout result before making a request" do
+        result = described_class.post("http://example.com/hook", json: "{}", timeout: 0.05)
+        expect(result[:code]).to eq(-1)
+        expect(WebMock).not_to have_requested(:post, "http://example.com/hook")
+      end
+    end
+
+    context "when the host resolves to a public address" do
+      before do
+        allow(Resolv).to receive(:getaddresses).with("example.com").and_return(["93.184.216.34"])
+        stub_request(:post, "http://example.com/hook").to_return(status: 200, body: "OK")
+      end
+
+      it "pins the connection to the validated address and performs the request" do
+        expect_any_instance_of(Net::HTTP).to receive(:ipaddr=).with("93.184.216.34").and_call_original
+        result = described_class.post("http://example.com/hook", json: "{}")
+        expect(result[:code]).to eq(200)
+        expect(WebMock).to have_requested(:post, "http://example.com/hook")
+      end
+    end
+
+    context "when the blocked host is allowlisted" do
+      before do
+        allow(Postal::Config.postal).to receive(:allowed_request_destinations).and_return(["internal.example.com"])
+        allow(Resolv).to receive(:getaddresses).with("internal.example.com").and_return(["10.0.0.5"])
+        stub_request(:post, "http://internal.example.com/hook").to_return(status: 200, body: "OK")
+      end
+
+      it "performs the request" do
+        result = described_class.post("http://internal.example.com/hook", json: "{}")
+        expect(result[:code]).to eq(200)
+        expect(WebMock).to have_requested(:post, "http://internal.example.com/hook")
+      end
+    end
+  end
+end
--- a/spec/lib/postal/message_db/database_spec.rb
+++ b/spec/lib/postal/message_db/database_spec.rb
@@ -14,5 +14,64 @@ describe Postal::MessageDB::Database do
    it "should return the current schema version" do
      expect(database.schema_version).to be_a Integer
    end
+
+    describe "#escape_identifier" do
+      it "wraps a plain identifier in backticks" do
+        expect(database.send(:escape_identifier, "id")).to eq "`id`"
+      end
+
+      it "doubles embedded backticks so the value cannot break out of the quoting" do
+        expect(database.send(:escape_identifier, "id`=0 OR SLEEP(5)#"))
+          .to eq "`id``=0 OR SLEEP(5)#`"
+      end
+
+      it "coerces non-string identifiers to a string" do
+        expect(database.send(:escape_identifier, :token)).to eq "`token`"
+      end
+    end
+
+    describe "#hash_to_sql" do
+      it "builds a simple equality condition" do
+        expect(database.send(:hash_to_sql, { "id" => 5 })).to eq "`id` = '5'"
+      end
+
+      it "builds an IN condition for an array of integers" do
+        expect(database.send(:hash_to_sql, { "id" => [1, 2] })).to eq "`id` IN (1, 2)"
+      end
+
+      it "builds operator conditions for a hash value" do
+        expect(database.send(:hash_to_sql, { "id" => { greater_than: 1 } }))
+          .to eq "`id` > '1'"
+      end
+
+      # Regression tests for GHSA-x2hq-rfpg-3xr5: a backtick in the condition
+      # key must be neutralised so it cannot close the identifier quoting and
+      # inject arbitrary SQL.
+      it "neutralises a backtick injection in an equality key" do
+        sql = database.send(:hash_to_sql, { "id`=0 OR SLEEP(5)#" => "x" })
+        expect(sql).to eq "`id``=0 OR SLEEP(5)#` = 'x'"
+      end
+
+      it "neutralises a backtick injection in an IN key" do
+        sql = database.send(:hash_to_sql, { "id`)#" => %w[a b] })
+        expect(sql).to eq "`id``)#` IN ('a', 'b')"
+      end
+
+      it "neutralises a backtick injection in an operator key" do
+        sql = database.send(:hash_to_sql, { "id`#" => { greater_than: 1 } })
+        expect(sql).to eq "`id``#` > '1'"
+      end
+    end
+
+    describe "#select with a hostile condition key" do
+      # End-to-end proof against the live test database: the injected key is
+      # treated as a single (non-existent) column identifier, so MySQL rejects
+      # the query instead of executing the injected SQL.
+      it "does not allow SQL injection via the condition key" do
+        expect do
+          database.select("messages", where: { "id`=0 OR 1=1#" => "x" }, limit: 1)
+        end.to raise_error(Mysql2::Error)
+      end
+    end
  end
 end
--- a/spec/models/http_endpoint_spec.rb
+++ b/spec/models/http_endpoint_spec.rb
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+# frozen_string_literal: true
+
+require "rails_helper"
+
+RSpec.describe HTTPEndpoint do
+  describe "validations" do
+    subject(:endpoint) { build(:http_endpoint, url: url) }
+
+    [
+      "https://example.com/messages/~user;v=1?token=a+b#section",
+      "http://example.com:8080/path?x=1&y=2",
+      "https://[2606:2800:220:1:248:1893:25c8:1946]/hook",
+    ].each do |valid_url|
+      context "with #{valid_url}" do
+        let(:url) { valid_url }
+
+        it "is valid" do
+          expect(endpoint).to be_valid
+        end
+      end
+    end
+
+    [
+      "ftp://example.com/hook",
+      "https:///missing-host",
+      "not a url",
+    ].each do |invalid_url|
+      context "with #{invalid_url}" do
+        let(:url) { invalid_url }
+
+        it "is invalid" do
+          expect(endpoint).not_to be_valid
+          expect(endpoint.errors[:url]).to be_present
+        end
+      end
+    end
+  end
+end
--- a/spec/services/webhook_delivery_service_spec.rb
+++ b/spec/services/webhook_delivery_service_spec.rb
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ RSpec.describe WebhookDeliveryService do
  let(:response_body) { "OK" }

  before do
+    allow(Resolv).to receive(:getaddresses).with("example.com").and_return(["93.184.216.34"])
    stub_request(:post, webhook.url).to_return(status: response_status, body: response_body)
  end

@@ -116,5 +117,26 @@ RSpec.describe WebhookDeliveryService do
        expect { webhook_request.reload }.to raise_error(ActiveRecord::RecordNotFound)
      end
    end
+
+    context "when the webhook URL resolves to a blocked (private) address" do
+      let(:webhook_request) do
+        create(:webhook_request, :locked, webhook: webhook, url: "http://internal.example.com/hook")
+      end
+
+      before do
+        allow(Resolv).to receive(:getaddresses).with("internal.example.com").and_return(["127.0.0.1"])
+      end
+
+      it "does not make a request to the destination" do
+        service.call
+        expect(WebMock).not_to have_requested(:post, "http://internal.example.com/hook")
+      end
+
+      it "records the failure and schedules a retry" do
+        service.call
+        expect(webhook_request.reload.attempts).to eq(1)
+        expect(webhook_request.retry_after).to be_present
+      end
+    end
  end
 end
المؤلف	SHA1	الرسالة	التاريخ
github-actions[bot]	d038eaa8c7	chore(main): release 3.3.7 (#3577 ) Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <41898282+github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>	2026-06-03 16:24:45 +01:00
Adam Cooke	3b3defe271	doc: update config with new allowed request destinations option	2026-06-03 15:52:46 +01:00
Adam Cooke	029bfe098d	fix(specs): stub IPv6 support in address guard IPv6 literal spec The spec relied on the test machine having real IPv6 connectivity, which GitHub Actions runners do not have.	2026-06-03 15:43:02 +01:00
Adam Cooke	0445e5c509	chore(deps): upgrade rack & rails	2026-06-03 15:40:29 +01:00
Adam Cooke	11c9814474	fix(http): prevent SSRF in outbound webhook and HTTP endpoint requests Webhook and HTTP message endpoint deliveries both flow through Postal::HTTP, which parsed the user-supplied URL and connected to its host with no address validation. An authenticated user could point a webhook or endpoint at a private, loopback or link-local address (e.g. 127.0.0.1, 169.254.169.254 cloud metadata, RFC1918 hosts) and make the server issue requests into its own internal network. Add Postal::HTTP::AddressGuard, which resolves the destination host and rejects private/loopback/link-local/reserved/multicast IPv4 and IPv6 addresses, then pins the connection to the validated address so it cannot be redirected via a DNS-rebinding race. Administrators can permit specific destinations via the new postal.allowed_request_destinations config option (hostnames or IP/CIDR ranges). Address selection only uses families this server can actually reach so we do not pin to an IPv6 address on a host without IPv6 connectivity; IPv4 is preferred for predictability. HTTPEndpoint now validates that its URL is a well-formed HTTP(S) URL with a host.	2026-06-03 15:09:18 +01:00
Adam Cooke	4314a6ec1e	fix(message-db): prevent SQL injection via condition keys (GHSA-x2hq-rfpg-3xr5) The Legacy API message lookup endpoints parsed the request body as JSON and passed the `id` parameter straight through to the message database. A JSON object supplied for `id` arrived as a Ruby Hash and was used as a raw set of SQL `WHERE` conditions. `hash_to_sql` interpolated each Hash key directly inside backtick identifier quoting while escaping only the value, so a key containing a backtick could break out of the identifier and inject arbitrary SQL into the SELECT (blind, time-based) against the message database. Fixes: - Escape all identifiers (columns, tables, database names) through a new `escape_identifier` helper that wraps in backticks and doubles embedded backticks. Applied across hash_to_sql, select, insert, insert_multi, update and delete so no caller can inject via an identifier. - Validate the Legacy API `id` parameter at the controller boundary: reject any non-scalar value before it reaches the database and coerce it to an integer. Internal Hash-based lookups (e.g. tracking middleware) are unaffected. Adds regression tests at the unit (hash_to_sql / escape_identifier) and request (legacy messages/deliveries) levels.	2026-06-03 15:06:35 +01:00
Adam Cooke	8be1e27fec	chore: update security vulnerability reporting instructions	2026-06-03 15:03:51 +01:00