12 KiB
Privacy & Security Assessment — mithal.space
Prepared for: Ghaymah Systems remote technical exam Target: https://mithal.space/ ("مثال" — Arabic-first search engine) Date: 28 July 2026
⚠️ A note on methodology (read this first)
This assessment was produced using an automated content-fetch tool, not a live browser session. That means two things worked and one didn't:
- ✅ I could retrieve and read the rendered page content of the homepage,
/privacy, and/aboutpages. - ✅ I could confirm the site loads correctly over HTTPS (the fetch only succeeds over a valid TLS connection).
- ❌ I could not read raw HTTP response headers or cookie jar contents, because my sandboxed environment blocks direct network requests to arbitrary hosts (confirmed: a direct
curl -Ito mithal.space was rejected by my own egress proxy withhost_not_allowed, not by mithal.space itself).
For an exam that will likely be graded on genuine DevTools evidence, you should personally open Chrome/Firefox DevTools and confirm the items marked 🔲 below, then paste in screenshots. I've done the analysis and structure for you and filled in everything I could verify independently (⬜→✅) — you just need to capture the header/cookie screenshots to make it fully authoritative.
How to get the exact values (5 minutes):
- Open
https://mithal.space/in Chrome →F12→ Network tab → reload → click the topmithal.spacerequest → Headers tab → screenshot Response Headers. - Application tab → Cookies →
https://mithal.space→ screenshot the table (likely empty, per their own claim). - Security tab → confirm the padlock/certificate details.
- Network tab → filter by
Img/JS/XHR, reload, and scan the request list for any calls togoogle-analytics.com,googletagmanager.com,facebook.net,doubleclick.net,hotjar.com, etc.
1. DevTools Inspection Findings
🔒 HTTPS
- The site is served exclusively over HTTPS; the fetch could not have succeeded otherwise. ✅
- 🔲 To confirm manually: certificate issuer, validity dates, and whether
http://auto-redirects tohttps://(check via the Security tab / a manualhttp://mithal.spacevisit). - 🔲 To confirm manually: whether
Strict-Transport-Security(HSTS) is present in the response headers — this is what actually enforces HTTPS for returning visitors rather than just offering it.
🍪 Cookies
- The site's own privacy policy explicitly states it does not use cookies for tracking and does not use
localStoragefor monitoring. - No cookie-consent banner or cookie-setting script was visible in the extracted page content, which is consistent with that claim.
- 🔲 To confirm manually: open Application → Cookies. If the table is empty (or contains only a non-identifying, session-only cookie with no expiry), that corroborates the "no tracking cookies" claim. Note down any cookie name,
Secure/HttpOnly/SameSiteflags if any do exist.
🎯 Trackers / Third-Party Scripts
- No references to common third-party trackers (Google Analytics, Meta Pixel, Hotjar, etc.) appeared in the extracted homepage/about/privacy content, matching the site's claim of "no third-party trackers."
- Finding worth flagging in your report: the footer links to the site's affiliated projects —
ghaymah.systemsandmuejam.com— carry static UTM attribution parameters (utm_campaign=organic&utm_medium=search&utm_source=mithal.space). This isn't user-tracking (the tag is identical for every visitor), but it is a form of referral/marketing attribution, and it's worth noting as a minor inconsistency with an otherwise absolutist "zero tracking" positioning. - 🔲 To confirm manually: the Network tab request list is the authoritative source — check for any outbound request to a third-party analytics/ad domain on page load and on search.
📋 HTTP Response Headers
- Not independently retrievable from my environment (see methodology note).
- 🔲 To confirm manually — check specifically for:
Strict-Transport-SecurityContent-Security-PolicyX-Content-Type-Options: nosniffX-Frame-Options/frame-ancestors(in CSP)Referrer-PolicyPermissions-PolicyServer/X-Powered-By(whether they leak stack/version info)
2. Privacy Assessment Report (One Page)
Subject: Mithal (مثال) — Arabic-first, privacy-positioned search engine Operator: Ghaymah Systems, in partnership with Muejam
Summary judgment: Mithal's stated privacy posture is strong and unusually explicit for a search engine, and nothing observable in its public-facing content contradicts those claims. The main gaps are (a) claims that are currently unverifiable without live infrastructure access, and (b) one minor practice — attribution parameters on outbound links — that sits in tension with a "zero tracking, full stop" message.
Stated commitments (from /privacy and /about):
- No search query logging; no IP address retention; no device fingerprinting; no cross-site tracking cookies; no third-party trackers (explicitly names Google Analytics and Meta Pixel as things it refuses to embed).
- No personal information collected (no name/email/phone required).
- Frames itself explicitly against "surveillance capitalism" and names data-selling, behavioral profiling, and government data requests as practices it rejects.
- Claims to be open-source and auditable ("GitPasha" repository referenced), which — if true and the repo is public and current — is the single strongest form of verifiability a privacy claim can have, since it lets outsiders check the "no logging" promise against actual code rather than a policy document.
Strengths:
- Verifiability-by-design intent. Explicitly says privacy "should not require trust — it should be verifiable," and points to open-source code. This is a meaningfully stronger stance than a typical privacy policy, if the repository is genuinely public, current, and matches production.
- No account/PII requirement. Nothing to search requires sign-up, so there's no persistent identity to link queries to.
- Narrow, explicit "what we don't collect" list rather than vague language — easier to hold accountable than boilerplate.
Weaknesses / open questions:
- Policy vs. infrastructure gap. A privacy policy is a promise, not a technical control. Claims like "no IP logging" and "no persistent logs" are not independently verifiable from the outside without server-side transparency (e.g., a real, current, deployed open-source repo; a published audit; a warrant canary).
- Outbound UTM tagging on footer links to Ghaymah/Muejam is a small but real inconsistency with "zero tracking" absolutism — it's referral attribution, not user tracking, but a maximally strict privacy stance would avoid even that.
- No visible transparency report or update log. The policy states it is "permanent," but doesn't reference version history, a canary, or third-party audit results — all standard trust-building mechanisms among privacy-focused competitors (e.g., DuckDuckGo publishes independent audits and a detailed transparency page).
- Header/cookie posture unverified in this assessment — see Section 1. A search engine can honestly not track users while still having weak transport-security headers, which is a separate (but related) risk surface.
Overall: Mithal's privacy messaging is best-in-class in tone and specificity; its privacy proof is currently policy-based rather than technically demonstrated to an outside auditor. Closing that gap (open, current source code; published security headers; a real audit) would move it from "trust us" to "verify us," which is the standard it sets for itself.
3. Comparison: Mithal vs. Google Search vs. DuckDuckGo
| Privacy Dimension | Mithal | Google Search | DuckDuckGo |
|---|---|---|---|
| Search query logging | Claims none, tied to no query | Logs and retains queries, linked to Google account/ad profile if signed in | Claims no logging of personal search history |
| IP address handling | Claims no permanent storage | Retained and associated with account/ad ID | Does not use IP to build user profiles (per policy) |
| Cross-site tracking cookies | Claims none used | Extensive first- and third-party tracking (DoubleClick, ad cookies) | Blocks third-party trackers by default via its browser/extension; search itself sets minimal cookies (e.g., saved settings, non-identifying) |
| Personalized/behavioral ad targeting | None (no ad profile business model implied) | Core business model — profile-based ad targeting | Contextual (keyword-based) ads only, not behavioral profiles |
| Business model transparency | Framed as community/cultural mission (Arabic-first), funding model less explicit | Advertising revenue, extremely well documented (10-K filings, ad platform docs) | Ad-supported via contextual (non-tracking) ads; monetization model publicly explained |
| Independent verification | Claims open-source code; no published third-party audit found | Subject to regulatory audits (GDPR enforcement actions, antitrust rulings) but not "open" by design | Publishes detailed privacy practices and has been the subject of independent tracker-blocking research; source apps partially open |
| Regional/political framing | Explicit stance against "foreign surveillance" and government data requests to Arab users | Complies with valid legal/government data requests globally | Publishes clear policy on government data requests (does not have data to hand over for search history) |
Takeaway: Mithal and DuckDuckGo occupy a similar "no-tracking-by-design" positioning and both contrast themselves against Google's ad-driven, profile-based model. DuckDuckGo currently has the edge in demonstrated trust (longer track record, third-party research coverage, detailed public documentation), while Mithal's differentiator is its Arabic-first mission and its stated (but not yet independently confirmed) open-source verifiability.
4. Three Recommended Security Improvements for Mithal
-
Harden and publish HTTP security headers. Explicitly set
Strict-Transport-Security(with a long max-age andpreload), a restrictiveContent-Security-Policy(blocking inline scripts/unapproved origins — which also technically enforces the "no third-party trackers" promise instead of just asserting it),X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff,Referrer-Policy: no-referrer(orstrict-origin-when-cross-origin), andPermissions-Policyto disable unused browser features (camera, geolocation, microphone). This turns privacy claims into privacy controls a browser will enforce. -
Remove or neutralize outbound tracking parameters. Strip the static UTM parameters from footer links to
ghaymah.systemsandmuejam.com, or route them through a referrer-stripping internal redirect. This closes the one observable gap between "we do zero tracking" messaging and actual link behavior, and also prevents leaking "came from mithal.space search" context to third-party analytics on the destination sites via the query string/referrer. -
Publish independent, verifiable proof of the no-logging claim. Since Mithal already claims to be open-source, make the repository genuinely public, current, and clearly mapped to the production deployment; commission an independent third-party security/privacy audit (similar to what DuckDuckGo and Brave Search publish); and consider a signed transparency report or warrant canary. This converts the strongest part of Mithal's pitch — "privacy should be verifiable, not trusted" — from a stated principle into something an examiner (or any user) can actually check, rather than relying solely on the policy page's word.