5.4 KiB
5.4 KiB
Comprehensive Ransomware Prevention Plan
Goal: Eliminate the key attack vectors that allow ransomware to reach and encrypt Ghaymah Block Storage.
Prevention Layer 1: Access Control & Authentication
1.1 Eliminate Password-Only Authentication
- Replace SSH passwords with SSH keys for all server access.
- Disable password-based SSH login:
# /etc/ssh/sshd_config PasswordAuthentication no PermitRootLogin no PubkeyAuthentication yes - Restrict SSH access to a VPN or bastion host only.
1.2 Enforce Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA)
- Require MFA for:
- Cloud console / Ghaymah dashboard access
- All admin and privileged user accounts
- CI/CD pipeline credentials
1.3 Principle of Least Privilege
- Application containers and services should never have Block Storage mount access unless explicitly required.
- Use separate IAM roles: one for read, one for write, none for delete by default.
- Administrative access to cloud resources requires MFA + session time limit.
Prevention Layer 2: Endpoint & System Hardening
2.1 Keep Systems Patched
# Automate security updates (Ubuntu/Debian)
sudo apt-get install unattended-upgrades -y
sudo dpkg-reconfigure --priority=low unattended-upgrades
2.2 Restrict Executable Permissions
- Mount Block Storage with
noexecflag to prevent direct execution of files from storage:# /etc/fstab /dev/sdb /mnt/data ext4 defaults,noexec,nosuid 0 2 - This means even if a ransomware binary is uploaded to Block Storage, it cannot run directly from there.
2.3 Disable Unused Services
# Disable unnecessary services
sudo systemctl disable --now telnet ftp rpcbind
sudo ufw enable
sudo ufw default deny incoming
sudo ufw default allow outgoing
sudo ufw allow 22/tcp # SSH from known IPs only
sudo ufw allow 443/tcp # HTTPS
Prevention Layer 3: Network Security
3.1 Segment the Network
- Block Storage volumes should only be attached to authorized instances and protected from unauthorized access.
- Use private subnets:
Public subnet: Load Balancer, API Gateway Private subnet: Application Servers, Block Storage Database subnet: PostgreSQL, Redis (no internet access)
3.2 Block Lateral Movement
Apply Ghaymah network policies to prevent instances from communicating with each other unless explicitly needed:
# Network policy: deny all east-west traffic by default
# Only allow app-server → database on port 5432
# Only allow app-server → block-storage on mount connection
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: deny-lateral-movement
spec:
podSelector: {}
policyTypes:
- Ingress
- Egress
egress:
- to:
- podSelector:
matchLabels:
tier: database
ports:
- port: 5432
3.3 DNS Filtering & Egress Control
- Implement DNS-based blocking to prevent ransomware C2 (command-and-control) communication.
- Block outbound traffic to known malicious domains using a threat intelligence feed.
- Allow-list only required outbound destinations (e.g., update servers, CDNs).
Prevention Layer 4: Email & Social Engineering Defense
| Control | Implementation |
|---|---|
| Email filtering | Block executable attachments (.exe, .bat, .ps1, .vbs) |
| Link scanning | Scan all URLs in emails before delivery |
| Phishing simulation | Run quarterly phishing drills with staff |
| Security awareness training | Train all employees on ransomware recognition |
| DMARC/SPF/DKIM | Prevent email spoofing using DNS mail security records |
Prevention Layer 5: Monitoring & Early Detection
5.1 File Integrity Monitoring (FIM)
Monitor Block Storage for unusual file rename patterns:
# Install auditd for file system monitoring
sudo apt-get install auditd -y
# Watch for mass file renames (ransomware signature)
auditctl -w /mnt/data -p wra -k file_modification
# Alert on rename events
ausearch -k file_modification | grep "rename"
5.2 SIEM Alerts (from Q4)
Configure the SIEM (siem.py) to detect early ransomware indicators:
- Sudden spike in Block Storage write IOPS (>1000 writes/minute)
- Mass file extension changes
- New processes accessing large numbers of files in seconds
- Outbound connections to unknown external IPs from storage-tier containers
5.3 Immutable Block Storage Snapshots
Configure snapshots with Object Lock (immutable mode) so they cannot be deleted — even by an admin account — for a defined retention period:
# Example command — replace with actual Ghaymah immutable storage configuration
ghaymah-cli storage bucket set-object-lock \
--bucket siem-backups \
--mode COMPLIANCE \
--retention-days 30
Prevention Checklist Summary
| Priority | Control | Status |
|---|---|---|
| 🔴 Critical | SSH key-only authentication | Implement immediately |
| 🔴 Critical | MFA for cloud console | Implement immediately |
| 🔴 Critical | Least-privilege IAM roles | Implement immediately |
| 🟠 High | Automated OS patching | This week |
| 🟠 High | Network segmentation (public/private subnets) | This week |
| 🟠 High | noexec on Block Storage mounts |
This week |
| 🟠 High | Immutable backup snapshots | This week |
| 🟡 Medium | DNS filtering / egress control | This month |
| 🟡 Medium | File Integrity Monitoring (FIM) | This month |
| 🟡 Medium | Phishing simulation program | This quarter |
| 🟢 Low | Security awareness training | This quarter |