Commit Graph
6 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Adam Cooke 11c9814474 fix(http): prevent SSRF in outbound webhook and HTTP endpoint requests
Webhook and HTTP message endpoint deliveries both flow through
Postal::HTTP, which parsed the user-supplied URL and connected to its
host with no address validation. An authenticated user could point a
webhook or endpoint at a private, loopback or link-local address (e.g.
127.0.0.1, 169.254.169.254 cloud metadata, RFC1918 hosts) and make the
server issue requests into its own internal network.

Add Postal::HTTP::AddressGuard, which resolves the destination host and
rejects private/loopback/link-local/reserved/multicast IPv4 and IPv6
addresses, then pins the connection to the validated address so it cannot
be redirected via a DNS-rebinding race. Administrators can permit specific
destinations via the new postal.allowed_request_destinations config option
(hostnames or IP/CIDR ranges).

Address selection only uses families this server can actually reach so we
do not pin to an IPv6 address on a host without IPv6 connectivity; IPv4 is
preferred for predictability. HTTPEndpoint now validates that its URL is a
well-formed HTTP(S) URL with a host.
2026-06-03 15:09:18 +01:00
Adam Cooke ab6d4430ba chore: upgrade to rails 7.1 and ruby 3.4 (#3457) 2025-10-01 16:42:39 +01:00
Adam Cooke 96d73653d7 feat: add sha256 signatures to outgoing http requests (#2874) 2024-03-13 08:52:29 +00:00
Adam Cooke a44e1f9081 refactor: refactors message dequeueing (#2810) 2024-02-23 22:51:36 +00:00
Adam Cooke 05d2ec4d04 refactor: move Postal::BounceMessage to app/models/bounce_message 2024-02-23 22:51:35 +00:00
Adam Cooke 2023200d91 test: add tests for Server model 2024-02-23 22:51:34 +00:00