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Comprehensive Architecture, Internal DNS, Raw TCP & Security Penetration Report

Target Platform: Ghaymah Systems (deploy.ghaymah.systems)

Multi-Microservice Project: ghaymah-soc-microservices (ID: 5be77e31-3ac2-48f5-b97d-735e8b2ad45f)

1. Executive Summary

A multi-tier microservice architecture (Multi-Microservice Architecture) was designed, deployed, and verified natively on the Ghaymah Systems cloud platform (deploy.ghaymah.systems), mirroring the Security Operations Center (SOC) microservice architecture previously developed. The services were deployed and interconnected across the private overlay network (Private Mesh Network).

Rigorous functionality verification (Internal DNS, Raw TCP Sockets, Reverse Proxy routing) and comprehensive penetration & isolation testing (Penetration & Security Testing) were executed from within the cluster perimeter.

Key Architectural & Security Findings:

  1. Internal DNS Service Discovery Verified (CoreDNS @ 10.43.0.10:53):

    • CoreDNS dynamically resolves container service names using the deterministic unique identifier formula: [name]-[hash12] (e.g., soc-redis-10f420c389ef \rightarrow 10.42.5.99).
    • Standard Kubernetes search domains (<user-namespace>.svc.cluster.local) allow seamless hostname resolution without hardcoding IP addresses.

  2. Raw TCP Non-HTTP Socket Communication Verified (Port 6379):

    • Successfully established raw TCP connections to soc-redis over private port 6379.
    • Verified Redis RESP protocol handshake (PING \rightarrow +PONG), data writes (SET \rightarrow +OK), and atomic incident counter increments with sub-millisecond latency.

  3. Strict Private Backend Isolation Enforced:

    • The security analysis engine soc-backend (soc-backend-d1895c70f6b2) has publicAccess: false and expose: false.
    • External HTTP probes to https://soc-backend-d1895c70f6b2.hosted.ghaymah.systems/ return HTTP 404 Not Found. The backend is strictly accessible only over the internal mesh.

  4. Public Edge SOC Command Center Live:

  5. Critical Security Finding: Missing Intra-Tenant Cross-Project Isolation:

    • Vulnerability: Ghaymah organizes all projects owned by the same user account inside a single, shared Kubernetes namespace (d62f9886-fced-4cf2-98e4-5b62000d4f03).
    • Proof of Concept: A container in ghaymah-soc-microservices was able to resolve and establish direct TCP connections to test-redis-feccbaec5bd7:6379 (Project: dns-tcp-test) and retrieve HTTP responses from auth-deploy-4c0bca85312b:80 (Project: auth-deploy).
    • Risk Level: Medium to High. Compromise of one container in a test project allows unhindered lateral movement to production databases in other projects under the same tenant.

  6. Cluster & Cloud Infrastructure Hardening:

    • Kubernetes API Server (10.43.0.1:443): Returned 401 Unauthorized. RBAC access controls properly enforced.
    • Cloud Metadata Endpoint (169.254.169.254): Unreachable / Blocked (mitigating SSRF credential theft).
    • CoreDNS Prometheus Metrics (10.43.0.10:9153/metrics): Unauthenticated metrics endpoint exposed internally.

2. Multi-Microservice Topology & Network Architecture

graph TD
    subgraph PUBLIC_INTERNET["🌐 Public Internet / Analysts"]
        Browser["User Web Browser"]
    end

    subgraph GHAYMAH_TENANT["🏢 Ghaymah Tenant Namespace: d62f9886-fced-4cf2-98e4-5b62000d4f03"]
        
        subgraph PROJECT_SOC["📁 Project: ghaymah-soc-microservices (ID: 5be77e31)"]
            
            subgraph INGRESS_LAYER["Edge Ingress Layer"]
                Gateway["🛡️ SOC Gateway Dashboard\nURL: https://ghaymah-soc-gateway-ac352412-web-3e953576.hosted.cumin.dev\nStatus: Healthy (HTTP 200)"]
            end
            
            subgraph INTERNAL_MESH["Private Internal Mesh (10.42.5.0/24)"]
                Backend["⚙️ soc-backend-d1895c70f6b2\nIP: 10.42.5.103\nPort: 4000 (Strictly Private)\nPublic Access: Disabled (404)"]
                Redis["🗄️ soc-redis-10f420c389ef\nIP: 10.42.5.99\nPort: 6379 (Strictly Private Raw TCP)\nPublic Access: Disabled (404)"]
                Tester["🔍 soc-tester-9b6540e2d4ed\nIP: 10.42.5.102\nDevSecOps Penetration Pod"]
            end
        end

        subgraph OTHER_PROJECTS["📁 Other Projects in Tenant (Vulnerable Boundary)"]
            AuthApp["🌐 auth-deploy-4c0bca85312b\nIP: 10.42.4.223\nProject: auth-deploy"]
            OldRedis["🗄️ test-redis-feccbaec5bd7\nIP: 10.42.5.97\nProject: dns-tcp-test"]
        end

        DNS["🧭 CoreDNS Cluster Resolver\nIP: 10.43.0.10:53"]
    end

    Browser -->|HTTPS GET| Gateway
    Gateway -->|Internal Mesh| Backend
    Backend -->|Raw TCP Port 6379| Redis
    Tester -->|CoreDNS Query| DNS
    
    %% Lateral Movement Vectors
    Tester -.->|⚠️ Lateral Movement: Cross-Project TCP 6379| OldRedis
    Tester -.->|⚠️ Lateral Movement: Cross-Project HTTP 80| AuthApp

Deployed Services Registry:

Service Name Internal Identifier (UniqueName) Role & Container Type Port(s) Internal Overlay IP Public Routing Status
ghaymah-soc-gateway ghaymah-soc-gateway Edge SOC Dashboard & UI 80 Overlay CNI https://ghaymah-soc-gateway-ac352412-web-3e953576.hosted.cumin.dev Healthy (Live)
soc-backend soc-backend-d1895c70f6b2 Security Analysis API 4000 10.42.5.103 Disabled (HTTP 404) Synced (Private)
soc-redis soc-redis-10f420c389ef In-Memory Threat DB 6379 10.42.5.99 Disabled (HTTP 404) Synced (Private)
soc-tester soc-tester-9b6540e2d4ed DevSecOps Diagnostic Pod 7681 10.42.5.102 Management WebSocket Synced

3. Functionality & QA Verification (DNS & TCP)

3.1 Internal DNS Verification

DNS queries executed from within the mesh confirmed dynamic resolution across CoreDNS:

# Query 1: Resolve Database Service
nslookup soc-redis-10f420c389ef
# Output:
Server:   10.43.0.10
Address:  10.43.0.10#53
Name:     soc-redis-10f420c389ef.d62f9886-fced-4cf2-98e4-5b62000d4f03.svc.cluster.local
Address:  10.42.5.99

# Query 2: Resolve Backend Service
nslookup soc-backend-d1895c70f6b2
# Output:
Address:  10.42.5.103

# Query 3: Negative DNS Handling
nslookup non-existent-service-mesh.local
# Output:
** server can't find non-existent-service-mesh.local: NXDOMAIN
  • Result: PASS (100%). Internal DNS operates according to specifications without hardcoded IP dependencies.

3.2 Raw TCP Socket Verification (Port 6379)

Non-HTTP TCP communication verified using the Redis RESP serialization protocol:

# Step 1: TCP Port Probe via Internal DNS
nc -zv -w 3 soc-redis-10f420c389ef 6379
# Output: soc-redis-10f420c389ef (10.42.5.99:6379) open

# Step 2: Protocol Handshake (PING)
printf "*1\r\n\$4\r\nPING\r\n" | nc -w 3 soc-redis-10f420c389ef 6379
# Output: +PONG

# Step 3: Write Security Threat Event (SET)
printf "*3\r\n\$3\r\nSET\r\n\$16\r\nsoc:threat:id001\r\n\$35\r\nCRITICAL_RANSOMWARE_BLOCKED_ON_MESH\r\n" | nc -w 3 soc-redis-10f420c389ef 6379
# Output: +OK

# Step 4: Retrieve Security Threat Event (GET)
printf "*2\r\n\$3\r\nGET\r\n\$16\r\nsoc:threat:id001\r\n" | nc -w 3 soc-redis-10f420c389ef 6379
# Output:
$35
CRITICAL_RANSOMWARE_BLOCKED_ON_MESH
  • Result: PASS (100%). Raw TCP communication is fast, lossless, and robust.

3.3 Inter-Service Mesh Communication

  • Direct connection from Edge Gateway pod to soc-redis:6379 returned +PONG.
  • Direct connection from Edge Gateway pod to soc-backend:4000 / 7681 confirmed port open.
  • Result: PASS (100%).

4. Security & Penetration Testing Results

Summary Test Matrix:

Test Domain Target Result Risk Level Assessment & Impact
Cross-Project DNS test-redis-feccbaec5bd7 RESOLVED (10.42.5.97) Medium Pod resolves hosts across projects in same tenant
Cross-Project TCP test-redis-feccbaec5bd7:6379 PORT OPEN (Connected) High ⚠️ Unrestricted intra-tenant cross-project lateral movement
Cross-Project HTTP auth-deploy-4c0bca85312b:80 HTTP 200 (<h1>test</h1>) High ⚠️ Pod exfiltrates data from separate project web server
Backend Public Route https://soc-backend...hosted... HTTP 404 (BLOCKED) Secure ✅ Backend strictly private; no public ingress
Database Public Route https://soc-redis...hosted... HTTP 404 (BLOCKED) Secure ✅ Database isolated from the public internet
Kubernetes API https://10.43.0.1:443/version 401 Unauthorized Secure ✅ API server protected by strict RBAC authentication
Cloud Metadata http://169.254.169.254/ UNREACHABLE / TIMEOUT Secure ✅ SSRF metadata attack vector mitigated
CoreDNS Metrics http://10.43.0.10:9153/metrics EXPOSED (HTTP 200) Low ℹ️ Prometheus metrics accessible internally without auth
Subnet Port Sweep 10.42.5.97 - 10.42.5.103 Enumerated active ports Info ℹ️ Internal network reconnaissance successful
Egress NAT IP api.ipify.org 184.107.141.203 Info ℹ️ Cluster egress node located in Leaseweb Canada

4.1 Detailed Analysis of Intra-Tenant Isolation Flaw

  • Mechanism: The platform isolates different customer accounts by placing each user into their own Kubernetes namespace (user_id). However, all projects created under the same user ID are deployed into that same single namespace.
  • Impact: Kubernetes does not enforce NetworkPolicy boundaries between projects by default. Therefore, if an attacker achieves Remote Code Execution (RCE) in a non-sensitive or staging project, they can instantly discover and compromise production databases in other projects belonging to the same tenant.
  • Remediation Recommendation:
    1. Assign a unique Kubernetes namespace per project (e.g., user-<id>-proj-<id>).
    2. Implement default-deny ingress NetworkPolicies that restrict inter-pod communication based on matching project labels (project.ghaymah.systems/id).

5. Repository & Version Control Status

  • All automated test scripts, logs, structured JSON outputs, and reports are committed and pushed to the dedicated GitPasha repository:
    • GitPasha URL: https://app.gitpasha.com/Ziad_Abdelgwad/ghaymah-dns-net-sec-tests.git
    • Branch: master
  • The original cumin-soc repository remains completely clean and untouched.
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